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ROBIN LAUERMANN (Grantham, PA)

REVIEW: M.B.B. BISKUPSKI, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE REBIRTH OF POLAND, 1914-1918
DORDRECHT: THE NETHERLANDS, 2012
By the turn of the 20th century, a significant wave of immigrants from Poland
had fled their homeland as it marked over one hundred years under partition rule by
the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian empires. As they resettled in diaspora,
including a significant number in the United States, they formed a significant base
of political activity to influence other nations’ foreign policies In this scrupulously
detailed work, M.B.B. Biskupski characterizes the activities by various civic associations of Polonia and their leaders to raise American consciousness, first for relief
and military support of the war-ravaged lands of Poland and then for its return to
independence. Two key lessons emerge: despite fragmented agendas and rivalries,
Polonia achieved its common goal of Polish independence in part due to intentional
leadership from the Polish community; despite the impact of the United States’ foreign policy contributions to this outcome, its lack of strong and consistent commitment to the cause meant that it was not quite the strong ally as some had perceived
it, often frustrating the accomplishment of Polish goals.
Built on extensive source documents in Polish and English, Biskupski presents a painstakingly detailed narrative that affirms the complexity of historical
developments. Although not fully ordered either by chronology or topic, the author provides a compelling wealth of evidence. Cautioning against deterministic
explanations for the outcome of Polish independence, he nevertheless reveals
some influential factors. American Poles demonstrated similar sub-divisions as
their international counterparts, though at times they could set those differences aside for the common good of a rebirthed Polish nation-state. Polish leaders
helped to generate attention within Polonia and connections with the American
government to promote their goals – for an army, for relief and for independence.
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America responded, but sometimes with more rhetoric and symbolism than effective policy decisions and commitments. As a result of this scholarship, we have a
much more detailed picture of the events that influenced the rebirth of the Polish
nation-state – before, during and after the war.
Biskupski’s account of the diverse perspectives within American Polonia, initially sketched in the first chapter, presents a complex picture. Contrary to some
summary images of immigrant groups, Poles were far from a monolith of perspective and experience. Sometimes seen as a “Fourth Partition,” this population was no
less divided than those in the land from whence they arrived.1 Individuals settling
in the Midwest, around the Great Lakes, tended to come from the German portion
of partitioned lands; they tended towards more clerical and economic traditionalism
with a pro-Russia stance. Those settling along the Atlantic came from eastern lands;
they tended towards more socialist and pro-German stances. In all, each of these
broad groupings were very much framed by the culture and experiences of their
emigration locations. Moreover, these multiple cleavages tended to be reinforcing
rather than cross-cutting, save for the overarching interest in some sort of independent Poland, so there was less common ground on which to build collaboration.
These differences were reflected in the organizations that developed within
Polonia producing, in turn, complications to efforts to support the Polish Question; that is, the return of Polish independence. Since the time of Alexis de Tocqueville, observers in America have seen civic associations as a mainstay of
generating support for political activity within the general public.2 These groups
bring together like-minded individuals, pooling efforts collectively, magnifying
their influence over what an average individual might accomplish. Within Polonia, Biskupski catalogs the varied associations that represented interests from
clerical (Polish Roman Catholic Union, ZPRK), to nationalist (Polish National
Alliance, ZNP), to martial (Polish Falcons Alliance of America, ZSP) and many
other groups.3 Throughout the text, he frames the events of the war and its resolution in an independent Polish state through the vantage point of these numerous
and sometimes competing groups, indicating the important role of grassroots participation in these efforts.
The plethora of organizations resulted in divergent perspectives on the ends
of a rebirthed Poland, reflecting more common ideological differences, resulting in an inability to tolerate the success of competing groups. These divisions
were perpetuated by those of parallel émigré camps in Europe, particularly those
spearheaded by Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski.4 Other leaders, such as
1
M.B.B. Biskupski, The United States and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-18. (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2012), 6-11.
2
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, transl. Henry Reeve (Project Gutenberg, 2006),
Volume I, Book I, Chapter XII, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/815 (accessed: 1 July 2019).
3
Biskupski, 10-16.
4
Ibid., 17-21.
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Ignacy Jan Paderewski, likely helped to promote sustained American attention to
their goals because of celebrity.5 However, social capital failed to bond the efforts
across American Polonia in significant ways, despite several attempts to create
larger umbrella organizations, such as the KON (National Defense Committee
– Komitet Obrony Narodowej), as the ideological competition usually tended to
rent cooperative efforts.6 As a result, the efforts by differing groups were often
seen as competition, rather than collaboration, which likely hampered the effectiveness of their work.
One of the several goals towards which Polonia worked involved repeated and faltering attempts, traced by Biskupski over several chapters, to fund
and recruit for a Polish national army. Initial efforts began in Poland with the
KTSSN (Temporary Coordinating Commission of Confederated Independence Parties) and RN (National Movement), and spread through connections to
American Polonia. Dr. Teofil Starzyński initiated efforts by the Falcons to lead
the organizational and funding elements. Very quickly, divisions between traditionalists and the left created challenges in cooperating on this goal. A solution
offered involved centering efforts for a Polish army in France, encouraged by
Wacław Gąsiorowski, but faltered to lack of funding and support by the French
government.7 A second option for conglomerating and training recruits in Canada, promoted by the PCKR (Polish Central Relief Committee), would likewise
dissolve after opportunities to fight on Polish and Russian behalf dissolved.
Leftist efforts, aligned through the NKN (Supreme National Committee) to support the efforts in Austria also fell through.8 Anti-Semitic impulses, evident in
Poland during the war and in clashes within America, also hindered collaborative support in this area as it opened the movement to criticism of its character
and question of its merit.9 The initiative would lose its momentum for a time.
Efforts to create the army were also hampered by imaging of Polish ties to subterfuge. Segments of the foreign press attempted an appeal to discourage America’s entry into the war, due to concerns of how it might impact the outcome. In
response, the British launched campaigns, not only to discredit particular editors,
but also to cast German Poles as agents of the European powers that ruled their
homeland.10 Despite limited evidence of actual collusion, efforts by domestic opponents of the KON, along with Allied powers, gained credibility with the larger
public, discouraging support for the recruitment of American Poles to serve in
the army.11
Ibid., 28-29.
Ibid., 31-32.
7
Ibid., 50-54.
8
Ibid., 59-63.
9
Ibid., 76-77.
10
Ibid., 99-104.
11
Ibid., 105-19.
5
6
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As with other developments, it took movement by other international actors
to spur America to further action. Jan M. Horodyski would serve as mediator
on these issues, reporting to Paderewski. After delays in agreement forming
“Kościuszko’s Corps” within the United States army, or as contingents of noncitizens in Canada, the French government indicated a renewal in its own interest
and support.12 However, it would be the transition in Russian governments in
1917 that would lead to the authorization of the first official unit.13 Yet despite the
formal recognition of these units, the Polish army languished, as citizens were
not eligible to serve outside American forces and those not eligible for draft faced
uncertain return under immigration law.
Once the United States entered the war, German and Austrian Poles became
enemy aliens as opposed to refugees. Attempts to gain certificates of nationality for
potential recruits were slowly addressed by the administration, showing a lack of
awareness of the impact from the war that this population faced. Only late in the
war was permission granted for recruiting of American Poles, along with concerted
training efforts in several locations along the Canadian-American border.14 As the
army’s ranks also flourished from the gathering of Poles elsewhere in the world,
larger scale developments in the war would determine that this activity was too
little too late for the army to make its anticipated impact.15 However, the persistent
attention to this concern would allow for inroads on other affairs of Polonia.
When military recruitment efforts stalled earlier in the war, members of Polonia turned their attention towards relief assistance, albeit, ultimately unsuccessfully. Polish celebrities, such as Paderewski and Henryk Sienkiewicz, made use
of their renown to build attention to the suffering in Poland brought on by the
war.16 Their founding of the Vevey Committee, in partnership with several others,
dominated the relief efforts. Their pro-Russian/Entente leanings created dissatisfaction among those aligning with Austria/ Germany, especially with its resulting
alliance with the PCKR, and for Jews who came to America from Poland who experienced poor treatment there.17 Moreover, they undercut perceived rival efforts,
such as the Kochańska Committee, burning bridges with others who shared a
larger concern for the homeland.18 Ultimately, the efforts raised a meager amount
in relation to relief efforts for other nations, at least until major organizations such
as the Rockefeller Foundation became involved and émigré leaders convinced the
American government to support its cause.19
Ibid., 279-86.
Ibid., 287-90.
14
Ibid., 341-45.
15
Ibid., 349-52.
16
Ibid., 65-68.
17
Ibid., 69-76.
18
Ibid., 86-96.
19
Ibid., 124-27.
12
13
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Despite the relative lack of sustained success of the relief effort compared to
those for other European nations, such as Belgium, Biskupski asserts that it did
stimulate attention to the Polish cause within American society and thereby helped
to facilitate movement on the Polish Question, which would not be resolved until
the conclusion of the war. The devastation visited on Polish territories both by Russian and German troops produced concern within the American public and government, especially with concerted attention to the issue in the national press. Earlier
efforts by Erazm Piltz in establishing the Central Polish Agency (CAP), an international body that solicited funds from American Poles, laid a foundation for action.20
In cooperation with the Polish National Department (WN), collaboration spread
across Polonia. That collaboration would be impacted by international developments, as the coordinated PCKR-WN successfully developed internationally while
the NKN-KON declined; however, the dissolution of formal competition meant
that a more coherent approach to President Wilson could occur.21
Paderewski, as the perceived diplomatic leader of the Polish cause, was successful in gaining entrée to President Wilson’s advisor Colonel House, on this
and other issues, though Biskupski notes that evidence is unclear as to the exact extent of Paderewski’s influence on American actions.22 Despite this contact
and America’s sympathetic rhetorical response, relief efforts would be stalled by
the blockade of Germany, which the British initially refused to lift, in whole or
part, without some guarantees for protections against German responses.23 After
lengthy diplomatic machinations, American support failed to secure agreements
with the British and German governments, as conditions in Poland remained
grim, but facilitated some furtherance of Polish national concerns.24 Despite unsuccessful efforts in ending the blockade, the United States’ displayed an open
interest to intervene on behalf of the Polish cause. These developments would
not have been possible without President Wilson’s openness as a leader to learn.
In his work, Biskupski also provides a view into the evolving perspective of
President Wilson, who went from near ignorance on Poland, Polonia and their
cause, to a receptive ally. His prior academic work said little about Poles, and
what there was of it was dismissive, as was his view of “hyphenated Americans.”25 As such he alienated Polish voters in 1912.26 Held to account for his
statements, he managed to overcome his negative reputation among this group.
Moreover, his veto of immigration restrictions won favor among Poles for the
20

Ibid., 160-64.
Ibid., 164-79.
22
Ibid., 131-40.
23
Ibid., 142-45.
24
Ibid., 145-46.
25
Ibid., 184-87, 194-96.
26
Ibid., 196-98.
21
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1916 election.27 Attentive to this group more closely, he would go on to insert the
United States into the international conversation with a push for Polish independence, though not before other foreign powers officially raised the issue.
Early attempts by Austria and Germany to control the evolution of events
produced a proclamation of November 5, 1916 establishing an as-yet-to-be determined independent Polish state; this potential outcome did not sit well with Russia, who feared the new state would align with its current enemies.28 However,
rather than giving a positive reception to this statement, the WN agitated among
American Polonia, claiming that it failed to deliver a true independent Poland.
Despite counter-efforts by KON to highlight the proclamation as a positive development, general attitudes tended to be negative.29 Wilson initially critiqued this
proclamation to the Senate, finding it self-serving to the actors who issued it.30 He
would later include a more specific and formal statement of support of Polish independence as his Thirteenth Point, advocating for its autonomy with sea access,
for which America would further push once the Central Powers were cornered.31
This assertion marked a consonance with broader administration policy towards
facilitating democracy, as well as an alignment with the Allied powers on the
question of Polish independence.
Once efforts finally turned to defining the borders of Poland, contestation still
abounded as to whether to draw boundaries based on pure geography, history,
ethnicity or other criteria. Initial considerations examined population dispersions
based on linguistic commonality.32 Continued conversation on the importance
of a sea-port through Danzig stretched these original criteria, resulting in five
potential combinations of partitioned lands.33 The conversations were complicated by contested views of data from two different censuses – one conducted by
tsarist Russia in 1897 and those by the Germans in 1916.34 Moreover, the experts
had to balance the proposed boundaries of Poland with concerns about other ethnic groups; the Baltic states, along with Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, where
members favored restoration of those territories as part of a Russian confederacy.35 But ultimately, Poland would achieve its independence, along with its seaport, simultaneously with the end of the war on November 11, 1918. Biskupski’s
research reveals that the path to independence was indeed complex, shaped by
Polonian efforts to influence American foreign policy.
27

Ibid., 200-12.
Ibid., 220-21.
29
Ibid., 223-24.
30
Ibid., 239-40.
31
Ibid., 328-36.
32
Ibid., 393-96.
33
Ibid., 398-405.
34
Ibid., 407-8.
35
Ibid., 409-12.
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